+=item C<$RestrictReferrer>
+
+If set to a false value, the HTTP C<Referer> (sic) header will not be
+checked to ensure that requests come from RT's own domain. As RT allows
+for GET requests to alter state, disabling this opens RT up to
+cross-site request forgery (CSRF) attacks.
+
+=cut
+
+Set($RestrictReferrer, 1);
+
+=item C<$RestrictLoginReferrer>
+
+If set to a false value, RT will allow the user to log in from any link
+or request, merely by passing in C<user> and C<pass> parameters; setting
+it to a true value forces all logins to come from the login box, so the
+user is aware that they are being logged in. The default is off, for
+backwards compatability.
+
+=cut
+
+Set($RestrictLoginReferrer, 0);
+
+=item C<@ReferrerWhitelist>
+
+This is a list of hostname:port combinations that RT will treat as being
+part of RT's domain. This is particularly useful if you access RT as
+multiple hostnames or have an external auth system that needs to
+redirect back to RT once authentication is complete.
+
+ Set(@ReferrerWhitelist, qw(www.example.com:443 www3.example.com:80));
+
+If the "RT has detected a possible cross-site request forgery" error is triggered
+by a host:port sent by your browser that you believe should be valid, you can copy
+the host:port from the error message into this list.
+
+Simple wildcards, similar to SSL certificates, are allowed. For example:
+
+ *.example.com:80 # matches foo.example.com
+ # but not example.com
+ # or foo.bar.example.com
+
+ www*.example.com:80 # matches www3.example.com
+ # and www-test.example.com
+ # and www.example.com
+
+=cut
+
+Set(@ReferrerWhitelist, qw());
+
projects / freeside.git / blobdiff